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Executive Summary
This paper examines the likely effects of the aging of the baby boom on labor force
attachment, unemployment, and wages. Labor market trends between now and 2020 are the focus
of analysis, when the majority of the baby boom generation will confront its retirement decision.
We begin by reviewing past labor force trends and discussing important limitations of
existing projection methods. Key elements needed to project the consequences of the demographic
shock facing the labor market are identified. The task of developing a fully specified economic
model to examine the effect of the aging of the baby boom on the labor market is as yet incomplete.
On the basis of the best available evidence, we suggest the following conclusions can be drawn:
-The trend towards earlier retirement will slow and perhaps reverse in the next few
decades.
-Unemployment should fall among older workers and the aggregate full-employment
unemployment rate should also decline as the baby boom ages.
-The aging of the baby boom will not depress wages substantially, either for older workers
or for other demographic groups.
fPhillip B. Levine and Olivia S. Mitchell
Introduction
While many have written about possible effects of the baby boom on the U.S. economy,
few have recognized that this demographic transition provides analysts with a unique and valuable
opportunity to investigate how the labor market works. Specifically, as baby boomers move up
the age distribution, they impart a one-time shock to the supply of potential workers in each age
bracket. Because this change is exogenous, many of the tools labor economists typically apply can
be utilized to predict how the aging of the baby boom will alter key labor market outcomes.
Theoretical and empirical models which (either implicitly or explicitly) hold constant structural
parameters in order to work through the effects of an exogenous shock are well-suited to address
this issue.
The goal of this paper is to use economic tools to analyze the impact of the baby boom on
three key labor market outcomes: labor force participation rates, unemployment, and wages. We
concentrate mainly on this particular cohort's labor market outcomes, but also consider the
implications of this group for the labor market as a whole. Since most of the prime-age population
participates in the labor market, we focus analysis on labor market trends between the period
between the present and 2020, when the majority of the baby boom generation will confront the
retirement decision. Consequently, an important topic of discussion will be retirement patterns of
older workers and a consideration of whether the trend towards earlier retirement will continue in
the next three decades. In addition, we briefly examine the effects of the aging baby boom on
unemployment, and on wages for older workers as well as for workers of other ages.
Our review of the evidence leads us to conclude that trends towards earlier retirement will
slow and perhaps reverse. New Social Security rules have already been enacted to encourage later
2retirement. Pension incentives towards early retirement will be curtailed as fewer workers will be
available to replace retiring baby boomers. A great deal of evidence indicates that [mancial
incentives have a strong impact on workers' retirement decisions, so these changes in pensions and
Social Security should slow the trend toward earlier retirement. Our prediction is funher supponed
by data on projected changes in workforce composition. Since growth will probably not be
concentrated in the blue-collar sector where worker's productivity is more likely to decline with
age, early retirement may be avoided by more workers in the future.
We also conclude that the aging labor market will bring with it a reduction in
unemployment, and will have little impact on relative wages. Both unemployment among older
workers and the aggregate full-employment unemployment rate should fall as the baby boom ages.
While job displacement of older workers currently leads to substantial hardship, this problem
should be somewhat reduced in the future. In future economic expansions, businesses will not be
able to rely on a young "reserve army of the unemployed" to fill new positions as in the past;
displaced older workers may more often become the new recruits. Steady state aggregate
unemployment should also fall as the labor force becomes more heavily weighted with older
workers with traditionally lower unemployment rates. The effect of baby boom aging on wages is
more difficult to track because employers have the potential to substitute capital for labor, and to
hire workers from other demographic groups. However, controlling for all such interactions, there
is no suppon for the conclusion that wages will be substantially depressed either for older
workers, or for other demographic groups.
The argument is developed in three pans. A first section reviews recent labor force trends
and discusses published predictions regarding retirement patterns as the baby boom ages over the
next three decades. The second section identifies detenninants of retirement suggested by the labor
economics literature of the past decade and offers informed judgement about possible future
panicipation patterns. The third pan of the paper briefly examines the effects of an aging baby
boom on unemployment and wages. A brief summary concludes the discussion.
3Labor Force Trends. Past and Future
Before examining projections regarding the future labor force, it is useful to briefly review
labor force developments to date as well as the explanations for these patterns. Here we sketch past
trends in labor force participation, and then go on to discuss previous efforts to project labor force
figures into the future.
Lookin~ Backward: Labor Market Trends to 1990
Labor force participation trends for older workers and over have been the subject of intense
discussion and debate in recent years. There is general agreement over several key facts:
-Lahar force participation rates for older men have dropped by half since 1900.
Among men age 60 and older, 66 percent were in the labor force in 1900, according to archival
evidence, while less than half that many, 26 percent, were active by 1990 (Table 1).
-The trend to earlier retirement among men ~ not been a steady one. In fact, men's participation
rates were quite stable between 1900 and the mid-'30's, then began falling in 1937, continued
falling steadily for fifty years through the late 1980's. (Figure 1). It is possible that the trend to
early retirement may actually have reversed over the last two years, inasmuch as participation rates
have risen in the 60-64 age range for two years in a row --a phenomenon almost without precedent
in the last quarter century in the United States. (Detailed age breakdowns by age appear in Figure
2 for men age 60-61 and 62-64 since 1960).
-Labor force trends for women have been more mixed over the century. Since 1900, older
women's labor force attachment figures rose, but their rates over the century fell relative to
younger women. Around 1900, older women's (age 55-64) participation rates stood at 21 percent
for nonmarried women, and 2 percent for wives. By 1980, participation rates for older
nonmarried women rose to 54 percent, and 37 percent for older wives. (Goldin 1990). Older
4women's participation rates are still about twenty percentage points below those of younger
women (USDOL 1991).
-For older women the trend to earlier retirement may have reversed slightly in the last five years.
As Figure 2 indicates, labor force participation rates of women in their early 60's have risen
slightly since about 1986. Nevertheless, older women's participation rates remained at only two
thirds those of similar aged male rates by 1990.
Overall, the evidence demonstrates a clear and increasing tendency not to work at older
ages among men, and a relative decline in participation among older women over time.
Labor market status of older people has also been examined using other variables as well.
Some analysts examine whether or not an individual was employed during a short period of time
(e.g. work during a single survey week) while others tabulate peoples' affIrmative answers to
questions like "are you now retired?" as an indication of retirement status (Fields and Mitchell
[1984] and Quinn et al [1990] review various defInitions ofretirement status). Most of these data
are not available over time, so cannot reveal much about trends in labor force attachment.
There is somewhat more research on what has been called "partial" or "phased" retirement,
generally viewed as employment subsequent to one's career job with either fewer hours of work
per week, or at a lower wage rate, or both. An investigation by Gustman and Steinmeier (1984)
showed that almost a quarter of the 64-year old and 38 percent of the 69-year old men examined
considered themselves partially retired by this measure during the 1970's. Subsequent analysis of
the same data set by Quinn et al. (1990) confIrms that most of these individuals spend only a short
time in this partial retirement status, moving out of the labor force thereafter rather rapidly.
Whether partial or phased retirement is gaining ground among the older workforce of the 1990's
cannot be determined yet, since there is no current longitudinal survey of this group. It is
anticipated that data necessary to examine these trends in the near future will be provided by the
5new Health and Retirement Survey, under development by the University of Michigan's Institute
for Survey Research and funded by the National Institute on Aging.
Last but not least, there is ample evidence that part time work has become more important
in older people's work patterns. As Quinn et al (1990) demonstrate, there is a large jump in the
prevalence of part time work at age 65, from 6 to 48 percent for men, and from 20 to almost 60
percent for women. This pattern complements other indicators of the trend toward early retirement
in the U.S. labor market: fewer people are remaining employed at older ages, and when they do
they are increasingly likely to work part-time rather than full time.
Lookin~ Forward: Published Labor Force PrQjections for the 21 Century
Will this powerful trend to earlier retirement in the US labor market continue? Over the
past few decades, labor force projections by the U.S. government, combining predicted population
trends and LFPR's, have become quite common. This section will consider where these
projections come from and what can be learned from them.
There are at least three major sources of labor force projections produced by research and
policy organizations and widely discussed in public policy circles. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) regularly presents projections with a relatively short horizon, typically no longer than 15
years into the future. Two other government agencies have provided labor force projections
further into the future. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes a report every five
years with projections that extend 50 years. In addition, the Social Security Administration (SSA)
has projected the size of the labor force to the year 2060. This agency's report was not part of a
continuing research program, however. It was conducted in the early 1980's to determine whether
existing financing methods could generate enough revenue to provide benefits to the anticipated
larger cohorts of retired workers.
As noted above, the projected size of the labor force is the product of two elements, the
anticipated size of the population and labor force participation rates. Since Preston's paper at this
6conference extensively analyzes population projections, we focus here on predicted labor force
participation rates.
The methodology that is employed in each these projections is quite similar (c.f. Flaim and
Fullerton 1978 for a detailed description of the BLS projection method). Typically, past trends are
extrapolated to predict future behavior. Ad hoc manipulations are then made to eliminate
impossible results (e.g. labor force participation rates greater than 100 percent or less than 0
percent) or results which are "highly implausible" (e.g. women's labor force participation rates
higher than men's). Minor adjustments are also made for other factors, such as the level of
economic growth (all projections presented here assume moderate growth). Some of the
projections are interrelated as well; the BEA's longer term projections start with the predicted rates
of the BLS and then extrapolate this series.
Table 2 presents alternative projections of the civilian labor force participation rate for
selected years and different demographic groups, in addition to a snapshot of current participation
rate patterns. The evident similarity in predicted participation rates for a given demographic group
(especially for men) is indicative of the similarity in techniques employed. For instance, the
participation rate predicted by the BEA for all men in 2015 is identical to the one predicted by SSA
for 2020: both agencies indicate that market attachment among men will fall from the current level
of 76.1 percent to 72 percent over the next 25 to 30 years. This prediction is largely a result of the
population being more heavily weighted towards older workers who have lower labor market
attachment.
There are some differences in projected rates for individual age groups among men,
however. Both the BLS and BEA project a continuing small decline in LFPR's among older men
(over age 65), while the SSA does not. On the other hand, the SSA's projected growth in teenage
labor force participation is considerably greater than in the BEA and BLS.
Projections for women are more variable, as one might expect given dramatic changes in
female labor force participation of the recent past. As was the case for the men, market attachment
among women as a whole is predicted to decrease after the year 2000 because of the changing age
7composition of the workforce. Estimates of labor force behavior among individual age groups
show marked discrepancies across projections, however. The BLS and BEA project a continued
large increase in participation among prime-age women while the SSA predicts virtually no change.
Also, SSA projections for older women show virtually no change from current rates, while the
BLS and BEA show a slight trend towards earlier retirement.
Historically, labor market projections seldom resemble observed behavior. As we will
demonstrate, relatively short-term projections by the BLS have not been very reliable for many
demographic groups where labor supply patterns have undergone change in the last decades. This
calls into even greater question the BEA and SSA projections extending beyond the next 15 years,
well into the 21st century.
Table 3 collects three BLS projections for age/sex groups made at three different points in
time, along with the observed participation rates in that year for that group. One striking
observation is that in some instances, the difference between projected and observed rates is over
50 percent. Groups where projections are fraught with the largest errors, as one might expect, are
women and older workers. For example, the 1985 rate for women aged 25-34 projected as
of 1970 was 46.7 percent, but the observed 1985 rate was 70.9 percent. The projections are not
always underestimates; thus, for instance, 35.9 percent of men aged 65-69 were projected to
participate in the labor force in 1985, but only 24.4 percent actually did
Another observation about these projections is that the pattern of discrepancy has changed
over time. Comparing actual data with projections for 1980 and 1985, two patterns were clear:
more women were entering the labor market and more men were retiring at younger ages than
anticipated. However, in 1990 these patterns appear to have reversed to some extent Projected
participation for younger women, between the ages of 16 and 24, was actually higher than
observed. Similarly, more older workers (over age 55, both men and women) remained in the
labor market than projections indicated.
This finding highlights an inherent flaw in projection technology which essentially relies on
a linear extrapolation with only minor modifications. When behavioral patterns change,
8projections using the existing methodology will be "too slow" to respond. To illustrate this
problem, consider observed and projected participation rates for women aged 20-24, one of the
demographic groups undergoing volatile change in their labor market behavior during the last
twenty years. (Note that while the focus of this section is clearly on labor force behavior of older
workers, this younger group was chosen for analysis here because it presents the best example of
the patterns we seek to explain). Figure 3 presents observed participation rates for this group from
1946 through 1990, along with four projections we have made through a simple linear
extrapolation technique. To correspond as closely as possible to Table 3, we project future labor
force participation rates for 1980, 1985, and 1990 using data available in 1965, 1970, and 1978,
respectively. In addition, participation in the year 2000 is also projected. The 20 years of
observed participation rates immediately preceding the projection date are used to estimate the linear
trend. Observed participation rates in the projection year are then incremented by the trend to
predict future values.
As reported in Table 4, rates predicted for 1980, 1985 and 1990 using linear extrapolation
are remarkably similar to those projected by the BLS for this demographic group. This suggests
that the BLS's judgmental adjustments to extrapolated rates were relatively minimal. Nevertheless,
there is a huge difference between the observed and projected rates. Projected figures understate
the observed in 1980 and 1985, and overstate them in 1990. This example provides a clear
indication of the problems inherent in existing projection methodology. When the rate of change in
LFPR's is increasing, linear extrapolation leads to underpredicted values without adjusting
extrapolated rates. Similarly, decreasing rates of change lead to overpredicted participation rates.
Both of these effects are observed in Figure 3. The fact that extrapolated rates to the year 2000 are
significantly different than the BLS projections (as shown in Table 4) indicates that in more recent
projections, larger adjustments must have been made.
Figures 4 and 5 and the remainder of Table 4 report the results of similar analyses for older
male and female workers (age 55-64). For older men, the increasing rate of early withdrawal from
the labor force led to overpredictions of the participation rate until the trend towards early
9retirement slowed in the mid 1980's. This last effect produced an underestimate of men's
participation for 1990. Note that the similarity in the linear extrapolations and the BLS projections
indicates that through 1990, few ad hoc adjustments were made to reported rates. However, the
fact that the BLS projections for the year 2000 are considerably higher than those obtained from
linear extrapolation indicates that a large ad hoc adjustment must have been made.
For older women, the increasing participation rates prior to 1965 led to substantially
overprojected rates for 1980 and 1985. In contrast, the relatively constant rates from 1965-85 led
to projected rates being too low in 1990, after rates began to rise again. The BLS projections for
this demographic group, however, have been consistently lower than those obtained by linear
extrapolation, indicating ad hoc reductions in projected rates occurred regularly through 1990. For
the year 2000, the BLS has now adjusted projections, raising the rate obtained by linear
extrapolation.
This section has extensively investigated the limitations of projection methods currently
used for "short-term" labor force projections. The problems in this exercise should cast serious
doubt on even longer term projections carried out by a variety of agencies and analysts. Our goal
has not been to indict current methodology, since under many circumstances it may be the best
technique available. Changes in the underlying structural parameters of the laoor market are
difficult to predict in many cases, implying that a mainly statistical procedure which masks the
effects of these economic factors may be the simplest approach. On the other hand, we believe
there are economic factors which should also inform a model used to project future labor force
outcomes. It is to the development of this model we turn next.
Economic Models of Retirement Trends
To understand how the baby boom will affect labor markets, an economic model of
behavior should be constructed. As argued at the outset, models of this sort would be particularly
useful in this context because they hold constant structural parameters in order to work through the
effects of an exogenous shock such as the one imparted on the labor market by the baby boom.
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Nevertheless, the task of developing a fully specified economic model to examine the effect of the
aging of the baby boom on the labor market is at present not possible. Indeed it probably will
require many more years of research. Instead of presenting a clearly inadequate formal model, we
instead undertake the job here of describing the building blocks that a fully specified model will
certainly need to incorporate. This section employs these building blocks to the question of how
retirement trends might be expected to change as we move toward 2020.
The Economic Determinants of Early Retirement
Ten years ago, many researchers in the retirement field believed that most older workers
remained employed as long as possible, and retired only when forced to by poor health, mandatory
retirement, or other "push" factors. However, this view has been deeply undermined by the last
decade of retirement research.
The Role of Poor Health:
It is certainly the case that health problems force some older workers to leave their jobs.
When this occurs, it must be agreed that retirement is not a choice but rather a necessity compelled
by poor health. The important issue, however, is how numerous are such people and whether the
incidence of disabling health problems is increasing among the population experiencing earlier
retirement --that is, workers in their late 50's and early 60's.
After reviewing the evidence, we believe that (1) there is little support for the view that
health is a major factor explaining early retirement, and (2) increasingly poor health cannot explain
the long-term trend toward earlier retirement in the United States. We focus first on the importance
of health as a determinant of early retirement. Here the evidence shows that relatively few give
health-related reasons for retirement. For example, only 12 percent of more than one thousand
men surveyed by the Social Security Administration gave poor health as the primary reason for
leaving their main job (Fields and Mitchell 1984). In addition, many researchers note that these
statistics will overstate the role of poor health because retirees' own assessment of their health
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status is colored by illness/disability being a socially acceptable rationale for retirement, and
because reporting oneself to be in poor health is a prerequisite for various government transfer
payments. An excellent review of recent studies can be found in Sammartino (1987). When
researchers examine more "objective" health measures from clinical sources, evidence on
impairments, and mortality outcomes, they generally conclude that health has some role to play,
but by no means is it as important as economic variables in explaining labor market withdrawal
(Fields and Mitchell 1984, Quinn et al. 1990). Thus most workers retire for reasons other than
poor health.
The weight of the evidence is also not supportive of the claim that the long-term trends
toward early retirement was driven primarily by worsening health among workers in their late 50's
and early 60's. The evidence is somewhat mixed, because problems arising in self-reported health
measures become exacerbated over time. Thus, for instance, Bailey (1987) notes large increases
over time in the number of self-reported days of limited activity due to illness or disability among
those age 45-64, as well as among the elderly. However the survey questionnaire was changed in
the late 1960's, resulting in the same number of people reporting health limitations, but a large
increase in the extent to which health limitations were deemed restrictive. Thus the time trend
Bailey reports in health limits is less than fully persuasive. Similarly, disability cases seem to be
increasing in the older population over time, but changes in eligibility rules for Social Security
Disability benefits may explain a large part of this trend. On the one hand, it seems clear that a
much older population will have more health problems than will a younger group (poterba and
Summers 1987). On the other hand, there is no strong evidence that the health status of those age
55 to 65 deteriorated sufficiently to explain the strong decline in work among this age group from
W orId War II onward.
Mandatory Retirement:
Prior to 1978, many employers imposed mandatory retirement at age 65. This policy was
altered in 1978 with the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which moved the
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mandatory retirement age to 70; subsequently the age bar was lifted altogether for most private
sector employees.
Even before mandatory retirement was outlawed, however, most fIrms did not force older
workers out using this policy (Fields and Mitchell 1984). Less than half of all private sector
workers during the early 1970's were in jobs covered by mandatory retirement provisions, and
fewer than 5 percent of retirees appear to have worked long enough to have been forced out by
mandatory retirement. Thus it seems safe to conclude that mandatory retirement was not an
increasingly powerful force driving workers to early retirement over the last several decades.
Having established that most older workers are not forced to retire, it is necessary to then
elaborate other explanations for early retirement. Research on workers reaching retirement age has
demonstrated that preeminent among these other explanations are economic factors, including most
importantly wages and retirement wealth. Along these lines, an analysis of older men's retirement
patterns by Fields and Mitchell (1984) concluded that economic factors such as wages and
retirement benefIts accounted for three-quarters of the explained variance in retirement ages across
people, while poor health was found to account for only one-quarter.
Wealth:
One factor which certainly played a role in inducing earlier retirement over time was an
increase in overall wealth. U.S. economic growth since World War II contributed importantly to
real wage growth over time, despite periods of inflation and economic slowdown. During most of
their productive lifetimes, workers earned more and accumulated more assets than their parents'
cohorts. As a consequence, succeeding generations of older persons attained retirement age in
better economic conditions than at most any time in the past (Burkhauser and Quinn 1989). Since
leisure is a normal good, in economic terms, this increase in older people's wealth permitted
additional consumption of retirement years over the decades (Fields and Mitchell 1984).
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Long-tenn asset growth was accompanied by two other developments which also
pennitted, if not encouraged, earlier retirement: the growth of the U.S. Social Security system,
and the maturation of the private pension system.
Social Security:
Several different institutional features of the Social Security system contributed to make
early retirement increasingly attractive and feasible over time in the US. First, coverage grew
rapidly over the post-wwn period: only about 60 percent of the labor force was covered during
the 1950's, whereas over 90 percent of all workers are covered now (Aaron, 1982). Almost all
retirees today receive some income from Social Security, compared to only about one-third of all
private sector workers receiving a pension (Piascentini and Cerino 1990).
A second institutional change implemented in Social Security over time had to do with the
age at which a worker could ftrst become eligible for Social Security retirement beneftts. This age,
initially set at 65, was dropped for women to age 62 in 1956, and for men in 1961 (Rejda 1982).
The fact that retirement payments are payable at 62 has enabled many to afford early retirement that
they might not have been able to afford otherwise.
Another way in which Social Security changed making retirement more attractive over time
had to do with beneftt growth. After taking into account inflation, the average Social Security
beneftt payable to a newly retired male rose 50 percent in real terms between 1955 and 1985
(Ippolito, 1990). Pre- and post-retirement increases of massive proportions were legislated by a
Congress eager to more than protect beneftts against inflation, a policy which made retirement
more affordable, and thus increasingly prevalent, among older Americans over time.
Two additional features of Social Security have been cited as contributing to earlier
J
retirement. One is that at various points over the years, beneftts under the system were structured
to subsidize early retirement (Fields and Mitchell 1984). This occurred when the present value of
future Social Security beneftts payable to a worker who retired early (age 62) were just as high as
(or higher than) the present value of beneftts payable to someone deferring early retirement. This
14
situation arose somewhat inadvertently, because the rules specified that someone who worked to
age 65 paid more tax than if he retired early, yet age-65 benefits were not enough larger to offset
this additional tax payment. In addition, the early retiree would enjoy leisure, further weighting the
balance in favor of leaving early.
A different way in which Social Security discouraged continued work after eligibility for
benefits is via the so called "earnings test". This regulation permits the older benefit recipient to
work and earn up to a threshold level, after which point Social Security payments begin to be
reduced to offset additional earnings. This Social Security "earnings test" is certainly a labor
market deterrent to some older workers, but several studies have also demonstrated that it is not
relevant to many others (Leonesio 1990). Part of the reason that the earnings test may not deter
work at older ages is that for some people, additional earnings beyond age 60 can have a
pronounced positive effect on the Social Security Primary Insurance Amount (this is particularly
important when high nominal earnings after age 60 replace low or zero wages earlier in life). While
there is still some controversy about the political wisdom of retaining the earnings test, the
evidence suggests that removing it would not induce much more work among the older population
though it would cost the system a great deal (Gustman and Steinmeier 1991).
While Social Security benefits certainly grew more generous for those retiring since World
War IT,these benefit increases must be weighed against increases in taxes which accompanied the
growth of the system. Taking into account this factor also suggests a damping effect: beneficiaries
retiring in 1950 earned an implicit (risk-free) return on their contributions of about 20 percent per
year in real terms, far exceeding that which they could have earned in the private market. The rate
of return on contributions was about 12 percent for workers retiring only 15 years later (Moffitt
1977), and will probably be even smaller, if not negative, in the future. What this implies is that
cohorts retiring forty years ago received relatively greater wealth transfers from the system than do
today's older workers, providing those early groups with stronger early retirement incentives than
were afforded to later ones. Hence the so-called "start-up" phase of Social Security provided the
first several retiring cohorts more wealth than later cohorts got, suggesting a diminution of
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retirement incentives in recent years. Whether and how retirement trends will respond to future
Social Security changes is taken up again in a subsequent section.
Pensions :
A variety of labor market institutions have made early retirement more attractive in the last
several decades, particularly the growth and development of employer-sponsored pensions. The
growth of the private pension system has been striking: immediately following World War II, only
19 percent of private sector wage and salary workers were covered by pension plans, whereas by
1987 the fraction covered was 46 percent (Turner and Beller 1990) This rapid growth in pension
coverage has moderated and perhaps even turned around over the last five to seven years,
however, evidently because of changing labor force composition, a shift to smaller firms and a
trend away from unionized manufacturing jobs (e.g. Clark and McDermed 1990).
There is ample evidence that employers and their workers enable and often encourage
earlier retirement over time, often by means of their pension plan. Recent research has shown that
defined benefit plans frequently offer attractive incentives to retire before age 65, and many do not
impose an actuarial reduction in benefits among those leaving early (Mitchell, forthcoming [aD.
Retirement supplements and bonuses, early retirement window plans, and a variety of other
mechanisms have the effect of offering benefits which are largest if the worker retires as soon as he
or she is eligible (Mutchler 1986, Lumsdaine et al1990). In other words, the present value of the
worker's retirement annuity stream from a defined benefit plan will often be maximized if early
retirement is accepted, but will gall the longer retirement is delayed (Mitchell and Fields, 1985).
Not only do such pensions offer retirement wealth which enables workers to retire earlier, but also
they structure benefits in such a way that workers can leave early without suffering large benefit
cuts. These patterns have a potent effect on workers' retirement decisions, a finding supported by
dozens of econometric studies conducted during the 1980's and carefully reviewed by Quinn et al
(1990).
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The effect of defmed benefit pensions on retirement is indisputable, but in order to account
for trends in early retirement it must also be demonstrated that corporate pension policy changed
over time in such a way as to increase the appeal of leaving early. Evidence on this point, while
~
difficult to obtain, is beginning to emerge in studies of specific companies tracked over time
(Luzadis and Mitchell forthcoming; Ippolito 1990). Available evidence offers evidence that at least
some defmed benefit plans changed their retirement incentives between 1960 and 1980 in such a
way as to increase the financial attractiveness of early retirement. This was accomplished by
increasing benefit payments and tilting pension benefit formulas to lower the age at which pension
benefit streams were maximized. Though explanations for these patterns are still only suggestive,
it is likely that these early retirement incentives grew more pronounced over time in less profitable
firms, and for workers with longer time on the job. It must be concluded that if pension plans
could be structured to make early retirement more appealing, it will be possible to reverse this trend
should labor shortages develop requiring extending the worklife.
Wages:
Wage patterns by eduction have diverged substantially over the last two decades, and this
subject has been the subject of intense study. In the main, this literature tends to conclude that
wages are becoming increasingly unequal over time, with earnings becoming particularly stagnant
among the least educated segment of the workforce (cf. Levy 1987). However few analysts have
narrowed the analysis to the older segment of the workforce and there is little evidence on whether
these wage trends are exacerbated among the older age group. Hence it is not currently known
whether falling wages may have contributed to earlier retirement trends experienced in the past
decade.
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Modelin~ the Effects of Future Demo~hic Chan~e on Early Retirement
Having identified above the most important regulatory and economic factors affecting
retirement outcomes, it remains to discuss how these factors might be anticipated to affect
retirement patterns as the laror force ages.
Focusing fIrst on the regulatory environment, we suspect that changing incentives will lead
to a reduction or reversal in the trend towards early retirement Many government policies have
recently been implemented to encourage continued work both now and in the future. This includes
legislation raising and then eliminating the practice of mandatory retirement for most sectors of the
labor market, as well as age discrimination legislation and disability regulations providing
opportunities for older workers to remain employed in the future should they so wish.
Social Security rules were also altered with reforms legislated in 1983, policies which will
be affecting retirement incentives for cohorts of retirees well into the 21st century. In summary
form, it is fair to characterize these reforms as raising the normal retirement age under Social
Security from age 65 to 67 for baby boomers, and reducing benefIts for those retiring prior to age
65. Additionally these reforms subjected a portion of retirees' Social Security benefIts to income
tax, which in turn reduces the net payoff to retirement and increases the relative attractiveness of
remaining employed. Unfortunately, the specific Social Security reforms undertaken will probably
have only a tiny effect on retirement patterns over the next thirty five years, according to numerous
evaluation studies using a variety of economic models. Instead, what will probably occur at least in
the near term is that workers will continue to retire at roughly the same age, but will be more at risk
for old-age poverty because benefits are lower (Mitchell, forthcoming [bD.
Other pressures on federal budgets may also affect retirement patterns. For example the
nation's health insurance program for people age 65 and over, Medicare, is scheduled to run out of
money several years before the baby boom reaches retirement age (Aaron et al 1989). These
pressures will certainly strengthen the government's intentions to reverse the early retirement trend,
though gradual changes in entitlement programs may not be effective in achieving this end.
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The other factor affecting retirement trends, as argued above, is employer-provided
pensions. Here too several changes may be anticipated (Andrews and Mitchell 1986). Pensions
may become less widespread and/or less generous in the future if, for example, marginal tax rates
fall thereby reducing the appeal of pensions as a savings device. If Congress limits or ends the
tax-preferred status of pensions in the future, this would seriously decrease pension plans' appeal
as a retirement savings devise and diminish the prevalence of corporate pensions. It also is
possible that the baby boom generation may receive lower total compensation because of its sheer
size (more on this below), implying that pensions may become less prevalent. Other factors also
likely to reduce pension coverage are declining fInn size and changing industrial mix. Economies
of scale make retirement investment more effIcient in larger fInns, but as the service sector replaces
the shrinking manufacturing sector, where smaller fInns are more prevalent, demand for pensions
will decline relative to the past. Related to this is the fact that union workers have traditionally
negotiated pensions more often than their nonunion counterparts; however most labor experts
predict continued stasis in the union sector, suggesting that on this count as well pensions will
decline in importance in the future.
Government pension policy will also playa role in shaping the environment within which
fInns structure their pension plans. A host of recent refonns have raised pension costs and
reduced the flexibility of compensation arrangements, including provisions limiting integration of
pension benefIts with Social Security payments, ceilings on the amount of contributions that can be
accumulated on a tax-deferred basis, and prohibitions against using age in pension computations.
Finns are now required to continue accruing pension benefIts after the nonnal retirement age for
older workers, ruling out cuts in benefIt accrual and thus inducing early retirement {Mitchell,
forthcoming [aD. Additionally, a very recent refonn outlaws the use of age as a criterion in early-
out window plans, further limiting fInns' ability to reward early retirement. These developments
place constraints on the range of policies fInns can adopt in the future regarding retirement age
policy. If government policy continues to restrict pension practices, this makes providing pensions
increasingly costly. Some of these additional costs may be offset by reducing wages or other
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employee benefits, but in other cases firms may be forced to terminate their pension plans which in
turn will reduce the incentives to retire early (Mitchell, 1990).
Some nonfinancial factors are also likely to affect retirement patterns. For example,
changes in productivity among older workers may also affect the decision to leave the labor force.
Mitchell, Levine, and Pozzebon (1988) review evidence indicating that differences in retirement
behavior across industries and occupations are correlated with differences in age/productivity
prof11es. Specifically, workers in blue collar occupations have been shown to retire relatively
earlier and to face greater productivity declines with age. However, at a macroeconomic level, the
movement away from manufacturing towards the service sector will lead to a smaller share of blue
collar jobs in the economy. Hence, diminished productivity should be less of a problem for older
workers and they may be expected to remain in the workforce longer as we move into the 21st
century.
The changing health status of older workers may have an impact on future retirement
behavior though there is controversy about the direction this will take. Most workers do not retire
for health-related reasons, and it may be that the small percentage that does should decline as a
result of improving health status in the future. On the other hand increasing longevity does not
necessarily translate into better health among older workers; people may simply live longer in a
poor state of health (Chapman, LaPlante, and Wilenski 1986; Ycas 1987). Hence offsetting health
patterns may not significantly affect future retirement behavior.
In summary: our review of the future paths of the economic determinants of retirement
suggests that the trend towards early retirement will slow and perhaps even reverse as the baby
boom moves beyond middle age. This conclusion rests on anticipated patterns of financial
incentives which have already been legislated (e.g. Social Security) and on others which we have
good reason to expect to change (e.g. pensions). In addition, sectoral shifts in the economy away
from blue collar work will also lead to reduced early retirement since productivity losses associated
with older blue collar workers will be less important as this sector contracts.
20
Other Labor Market Implications of an Al:in~ Workforce
Certainly the most direct impact of an aging baby boom will be on retirement behavior.
Nevertheless, the demographic change will certainly have other labor market consequences as well.
Here we focus on two additional outcomes: unemployment, and wages for both older and younger
workers.
While unemployment has been, and will remain, quite volatile over the business cycle,
recent evidence indicates that the "natural rate" or what other economists have termed the "full
employment-unemployment rate" has varied tremendously over time. For instance, the
unemployment rate of 4.1% in 1956 was the lowest rate in the years immediately preceding and
following it, indicating the top of the business cycle. The unemployment rate in two other peak
years, 1979 and 1989, were considerably higher at 5.8% and 5.0%, respectively.
While different arguments have been advanced to explain changes in the natural
unemployment rate over time, one important component of the explanation relies on the changing
age structure of the workforce since the baby boom has come of age. In 1956, baby boomers were
not yet in the labor force and had no effect on labor force statistics. However by 1979, baby
boomers had (for the most part) entered the labor market in full force, twisting the age distribution
of the workforce towards younger workers. Younger workers generally have higher
unemployment rates even during periods of full employment, because they experience relatively
more frictional unemployment As a result, the aggregate unemployment rate rose, since it is
simply the weighted average of each age group's unemployment rate. The weight on younger,
higher unemployment workers was therefore higher throughout the 1970's as a result of the
numerousness of the baby boom cohort
This aspect of rising unemployment patterns over time has been analyzed to some extent in
the economics literature (Antos, et. al. 1979). For instance, as much as a third of the increase in
national unemployment rates between 1957 and 1977 has been attributed to demographic change
(Flaim 1979). This change is so massive that some analysts suggest that national unemployment
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rates "should be computed with a fixed age-distribution of weights" which will reduce the bias in
time series observations of a changing age composition of the labor force (Cain 1979).
The good news is that the nation's unemployment rates should begin to fall, in mirror
image to what happened during the 1970's, as the baby boom ages. When baby boomers move
into the older age group, the heavy weight on a demographic group which experiences relatively
little unemployment will again reduce the aggregate unemployment rate. (Taking Cain's
perspective, of course, the national unemployment rate will now be "too low", in contrast to the
late 1970's.)
As a group, older workers experience less unemployment then their younger counterparts.
However those who do lose their job often experience a long spell of unemployment, and older
workers may fmd this more costly than do younger ones because they experience a greater gap
between earnings on the old and new job (Podgursky and Swaim 1987, Shapiro and Sandell 1987,
Howland and Peterson 1988). Average unemployment duration may also be longer for the older
individual than for younger workers. These fmdings have been interpreted as supportive of the
view that firms are reluctant to hire older workers since they will have fewer years remaining on
the job over which a firm can recoup investments in firm-specific training (Hutchens 1986, 1988).
We suggest that this pattern may change in the next thirty years as the baby boom ages.
When boomers flooded the labor market during the 1970's and early 1980's, firms could readily
hire younger workers and therefore spread training costs costs over many years. Wages offered to
older workers during this time were quite low, if they could find work at all. In contrast, when the
baby boom ages, companies may not be able to fmd enough younger workers. Though costs of
hiring an older worker are still high, a shortage of young workers could increase the relative
attractiveness of hiring an older worker. Therefore, looking toward 2020, we predict that
displaced older workers will still incur substantial losses upon unemployment, but on the positive
side, losses observed during the 1970's and early 1980's may be greatly diminished.
We focus last on the likely effects of labor force aging on wages. One might suspect that
baby boomers' relative wages will always be somewhat depressed because of crowding. In
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economic tenns, a simple labor market model might predict that as the quantity of workers in a
given age group increases, the wage they are paid will fall (this relies on the own price elasticity of
demand being negative). However, this simple analysis ignores the possibilities of substitutes ang
complements across different labor market groups, and between labor and capital. More complete
models which incorporate substitutes and complements have, to date, produced mixed evidence.
For example, research on young baby boomers entering the labor market during the 1970's
suggests support for the view that the large demographic bulge of workers forced down boomers'
wages (Freeman 1979, Welch 1979, Russell 1982). However the reverse pattern does not seem to
hold, at least in the one study which has addressed this question to date. Specifically, Levine and
Mitchell (1988) found no evidence that wages of older workers would be substantially altered
relative to younger workers as the baby boom ages, after estimating own- and cross-price demand
elasticities for eight different demographic groups. It seems fair to say that no massive changes in
wages can be attributed to demographic aging, on the basis of currently available evidence.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper examines the likely effects of the aging of the baby boom on labor force
attachment, unemployment, and wages. Labor market trends between now and 2020 are the focus
of analysis, when the majority of the baby boom generation will confront its retirement decision.
We have demonstrated several inherent flaws in projection methods which make minor
modifications to linear extrapolations. When behavioral patterns change, projections using the
existing methodology are "too slow" to respond. Therefore we outline the key elements of a more
comprehensive economic model to project the consequences of the demographic shock facing the
labor market On the basis of this analysis, we suggest the following conclusions:
1. The trend towards earlier retirement will slow and perhaps reverse in the next few
decades.
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2. Unemployment should fall among older workers and the aggregate full-employment
unemployment rate should also decline as the baby boom ages.
3. The aging of the baby boom will not depress wages substantially, either for older
workers or for other demographic groups.
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Year Percenta~e
1870 64.2
1880 64.3
1900 66.1
1930 64.5
1937 61.5
1940 54.7
1950 54.5
1960 45.4
1970 40.4
1980 32.2
1990 27.6
Table 1.
LaborForce Participationof Men Age 60 and over,
1870-1990
Source:
1870-1980: Ransom and Sutch (1988); note 1940 data not strictly comparable.
1990: USDOL (1991).
Table 2a.
CUITentand Projected Labor Force Participation Rates
by Sex and Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Observed BLS SSA BEA SSA
1990 2000 2000 2015 2020
All Men 76.1 75.9 77.5 72.0 72.0
Age group:
16-24 71.5 74.8
16-19 55.7 59.0 66.9 63.9 67.7
20-24 84.3 86.5 86.9 84.0 87.4
25-54 93.4 92.4
25-34 94.2 94.1 92.5
25-29 93.8 95.0 95.3
30-34 94.6 95.2 95.4
35-44 94.4 94.3 94.9
35-39 94.9 95.1 95.4
40-44 93.9 94.1 94.4
45-54 90.7 90.5 90.2
45-49 92.3 92.0 92.0
50-54 88.8 87.7 86.4
55-64 67.7 68.1 62.9
55-59 79.8 79.5 75.3
60-64 55.5 62.1 57.3
65+ 16.4 14.7 13.0
65-69 26.0 27.0 26.3
70+ 10.8 10.6 10.7
Table 2b.
Current and Projected Labor Force Participation Rates
by Sex and Age (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Observed BLS SSA BEA SSA
1990 2000 2000 2015 2020
All Women 57.5 62.6 59.0 57.5 54.6
Age group:
16-24 63.1
16-19 51.8 59.6 62.4 59.1 63.4
20-24 71.6 77.9 76.9 84.5 6.7
25-54 74.1 79.9
25-34 73.6 82.4 84.3
25-29 73.8 75.1 75.8
30-34 73.4 74.4 75.4
35-44 76.5 84.9 85.6
35-39 75.5 76.3 77.0
40-44 77.6 78.0 78.4
45-54 71.2 76.5 70.7
45-49 74.8 76.4 76.3
50-54 66.9 71.6 71.7
55-64 45.3 49.0 43.0
55-59 55.3 56.5 55.0
60-64 35.5 38.8 36.7
65+ 8.7 7.6 7.3
65-69 17.0 17.6 18.0
70+ 4.8 5.4 5.5
Source:
Column 1: USDOL (1991).
Column 2: Fullerton (1989).
Column 3 and 5: Social Security Administration (1983).
Column 4: Bureau of Economic Analysis (1985).
Table 3.
Comparison of Actual and "Short Tenn"
Labor Force Participation Rate Projections by Sex and Age
1980 1980 1985 1985 1990 1990
Actual Proiected* Actual Projected* Actual PrQjected*
All Men 76.8 80.3 76.3 80.4 76.1 76.4
Age group:
16-19 61.2 56.7 56.8 54.3 55.7 64.8
20-24 85.7 87.2 85.0 82.3 84.3 85.0
25-54 93.4 93.1
25-34 94.2 96.2 94.7 97.4
35-44 94.6 96.7 95.0 97.4
45-54 90.3 95.0 91.0 95.3
55-64 71.4 83.7 67.7 65.0
55-59 79.6 88.2
60-64 55.6 73.9
65+ 18.3 21.8 16.4 15.0
65-69 24.4 35.9
70+ 10.5 13.2
All Women 50.9 41.9 54.5 43.7 57.5 57.1
Age group:
16-19 53.0 46.6 41.2 52.1 51.8 62.8
20-24 69.0 52.6 71.8 57.9 71.6 80.4
25-54 74.1 72.4
25-34 65.3 40.3 70.9 46.7
35-44 65.2 50.0 71.8 53.6
45-54 59.6 59.5 64.4 55.6
55-64 41.1 47.3 45.3 39.8
55-59 50.3 52.3
60-64 33.4 38.7
65+ 7.6 9.9 8.7 6.2
65-69 13.5 16.3
70+ 4.3 5.1
~:
*All projections assume moderate economic growth. Projections for 1980 were made in 1965,
1985 projections in 1970 and 1990 projections in 1978.
Source:
Columns 1 and 2: Fullerton (1982).
Columns 3 and 4: Fullerton (1988).
Column 5: Flaim and Fullerton (1978).
Column 6: USDOL (1991).
1980 1985 1990 2000
Labor Force Participation Rates of:
Women Age 20-24
Observed 69.0 71.8 71.6
BLS Projection 52.6 57.9 80.4 77.9
Linear Extrapolation 52.1 65.2 81.6 88.5
Table4.
A Comparison of Projection EITOrsUsing Linear Extrapolations
and BLS Results, Selected Demographic Groups and Years
Men Age 55-64
Observed
BLS Projection
Linear Extrapolation
71.4
83.7
83.6
67.9
81.3
77.9
67.7
65.0
62.7
68.1
53.5
Women Age 55-64
Observed
BLS Projection
Linear Extrapolation
41.1
47.3
56.6
42.0
45.5
56.6
45.3
39.8
43.8
49.0
41.1
Figure 1
Labor Force Participation Rates
by Age and Sex, 1966-1990
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Figure 3
I Projection Errors using Linear Extrapolation:
LFPR's of 20-24 year old women
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Figure 4
I Projection Errors using Linear Extrapolation:
LFPR's of 55-64 Year Old Men
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Figure 5
I Projection Errors using Linear Extrapolation:
LFPR's of 55-64 Year Old Women
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